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Abstract 
Using data from the U. S. Bureau of Economic Analysis for the period 1947-2015, we esti-
mate investment equations for three types of fixed assets and three policy instruments. In par-
ticular, we disaggregate investment into structures, equipment and intangibles, and the policy 
instruments into the rates of replacement, interest and taxes. Additionally, we estimate an 
equation for total investment. At the aggregate level the long run elasticities of investment 
with respect to output and the user cost are found to vary narrowly around 0.83; the direct 
elasticities of investment with respect to the rates of replacement, interest and taxation are 
0.91, -0.04 and -0.23, whereas the indirect and inversely additive ones through the user cost   
are -0.11, -0.05 and -0.27, respectively. To highlight the significance of these findings, we 
investigate their implications for economic growth by focusing on four policy channels, i.e. 
aggregate demand, relative prices, and monetary and fiscal policies. We conclude that mone-
tary policy may be weak to stimulate investment, and even fall into the trap of the law of un-
intended consequences by slowing replacement investment down, since the average age of 
capital is related negatively to the discount rate. On the contrary fiscal policy is relatively 
more potent as a 10% reduction in the expected effective tax rate is found to boost investment 
directly and indirectly by as much as5% . In general, first best policies would aim at increas-
ing the replacement rate, particularly of intangibles and equipment in the same order. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last 50 years the bulk of research regarding the determinants and the time-structure of 
investment has drawn on the neoclassical theory of investment behavior,  as laid down original-
ly by Jorgenson (1963, 1967) and extended in various directions by Jorgenson, Stephenson 
(1967a, 1967b, 1967c), Hall, Jorgenson (1967, 1969) and others. Distilled from this literature 
and enhanced in the light of more recent refinements, this model of investment consists of the 
building blocks shown below:  
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where the symbols are defined as follows: Q  stands for the quantity of output;  
*,K K  are the 
quantities of optimal capital stock and that in place; I  is the quantity of gross investment; c  is 
the user cost of capital; , ,r u  represent the rates of depreciation, interest and taxes; ,q p  are 
the prices of investment goods and output;   is the elasticity of substitution of capital for la-
bor and coincides inversely with the elasticity of the user cost of capital;   is the elasticity of 
output and more technically the distribution parameter of the production function, which is 
assumed to be of the Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution (CES) type; ,w  are the proportions 
of current replacement and interest cost allowable for tax purposes; is a shift parameter; a 
dot over a variable indicates its time derivative; and capital gains are ignored. However, the 
empirical results obtained thus far are of limited usefulness for policy analysis and implementa-
tion. The lengthy working paper by Kose et al. (2017), which was just released by the World 
Bank and refers to the deceleration of investment in emerging countries since 2010, provides a 
timely example. Its authors think of a relationship derived from (1) in which investment is de-
termined in the long-run by a set of variables, including among others the interest rate, the tax 
rate, and the rate of replacement. But even though it is these variables that constitute the instru-
ments of fiscal and monetary policies, most of what we know about their influence on invest-
ment is indirect, because in much of the relevant empirical literature they are presumed to influ-
ence investment through the user cost of capital. By implication, improving policy effective-
ness in this important area warrants a reorientation of research efforts. 
 4 
Underscoring this need are at least three reasons. The first is that the identification and es-
timation of a stable relation between investment and the user cost has defied all improvements 
in modeling, data resourcefulness and estimating techniques. To ascertain this assessment, 
consider the elasticity of substitution of capital for labor . In the log-run it holds that
*0 and K K K  .1 Substituting into 1(a) and the resulting expression into 1(c) yields: 
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Note that since c is in the denominator of this equation the additive inverse of coincides 
with the elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost.
2 
From the survey by Chirinko 
(2008) not long ago, but also from more recent studies like the one by Dwenger (2014), it 
turns out that its estimates vary widely from above 1 to close to 0, with most of them falling 
in the range between 0.4 and 0.7. These are very imprecise to be suitable for policy purposes. 
The second reason is methodological and derives from the observation that the user cost for-
mula 1(b) is an aggregating function which glosses over the complex interactions of the vari-
ables ( , , )r u  and the implications are not hard to see. To unscramble the effects of a change, 
for example, in the tax rate, ,u  Hall, Jorgenson (1967, 1969) ignored these interactions.
3
 On the 
contrary, working with a large sample of firm data, Chirinko, Fazzari, Meyer (1999, 73) could 
not do the same, because they had to take account of the firm’s capital structure. So they speci-
fied the user cost as a multiplicative function of the relative capital and output prices, the tax 
rate, and the sum of the interest and depreciation rates. Lastly, the third reason springs from the 
expectation that by focusing on its determinants rather than the user cost itself, the estimations 
may yield sharper results since, even if these three rates change in compensating ways within 
each observation period, keeping them apart would be expected to preserve their variability and 
thus render their estimated influence on investment more succinct.   
                                                   
1
    We assume that in the long run the economy enters into a stationary state. In that state the capital stock is by 
definition stationary, and hence, gross investment equals retirements. By implication, all deviations from 
equation (2) reflect the short term adjustments that take place in the form of changes in net and replacement 
investment. As it will become apparent shortly, this conceptualization fits most appropriately with the error-
correction approach that we adopt in the estimations.  
2
    Even though at pertinent places below we shall issue reminders of this important detail, it should be kept in 
mind throughout because it will facilitate the understanding of the interpretation of our results.  
3
    For example, in Hall, Jorgenson (1967, 404) they state the following: 
“The effects of a change in tax policy are: (1) an initial burst of net investment which brings the 
capital stock up to the new desired capital stock, (2) a permanent increase in gross investment re-
sulting from replacement of a larger capital stock, and (3) a proportionate increase in net and gross 
investment caused by changes in other determinants of desired capital stock. To calculate the mag-
nitudes of these effects for various alternative policies, we have assumed that tax policy has no ef-
fect on the before-tax rate of return or on the price of capital goods.”(Emphasis added) 
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The objectives in this paper are fourfold. The first is to estimate the long-run investment 
equation (2) along with its short-term dynamics by disaggregating the user cost into its con-
stituent determinants. The second objective is to take advantage of the data on investment that 
are published by the U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis (henceforth BEA) for the period 
1947-1015. These data are disaggregated into structures, equipment, and intellectual property 
products (henceforth intangibles). Our expectation being that, by estimating the model sepa-
rately for the three types of investment goods as well as for total investment, we may get 
some glimpse into the implications of the aggregation for the estimated parameters. The third 
objective is to compute the long-run elasticities of investment with respect to its key determi-
nants so as to shed some light on sensitivity of the three types of investments, as well as of 
total investment, to changes in the policy instruments involved.  Lastly, the fourth objective is 
to highlight the policy implications of our findings to the current debate about the causes of 
secular stagnation in the U.S. For, if our hunch that fiscal and monetary policies have influ-
enced adversely the developments in the front of capital and investment is confirmed, revers-
ing the trends may require serious overhauling of these policies.  
Next section is devoted to the specification of the model. Section 3 focuses on the data, the 
definition and the measurement of the variables that enter into the model in the estimation 
stage. Section 4 discusses certain issues that have to do with the chosen estimating technique 
and provides the tables with the results. Section 4 presents and comments on the elasticities 
computed from the estimates of the model. Section 5 relates the findings from the empirical 
analysis to the issue of secular stagnation; and, finally, the paper closes in Section 6 with a 
summary of the main findings and conclusions. 
2. Specification of the model 
If business firms use Constant-Elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production functions and 
maximize their net worth in the presence of taxes and competitive product and input mar-
kets, in the long run the behavior of investment in the economy is described by (2). Ignor-
ing capital gains, the user cost term in the latter equation is given by 1(b). To disaggregate 
the user cost term into its determinants in a tractable manner, we propose to set the latter 
equation as per (3) below:  
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In this specification we allow the exponent of   to take any non-zero value on the conceptu-
alization that for certain fixed assets the utilization and maintenance policies that business 
firms apply relate the rate of replacement inversely to the user cost.
4
   
Substituting (3) into (2) and expressing the resulting equation in logarithms yields: 
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This is the equation which according to the neoclassical theory of investment purports to ex-
plain the investment behavior of the representative firm in the long-run. The elasticities in this 
time frame are certainly significant because they highlight the cumulative responses of in-
vestment to policy changes. But of not less significance are also the short-term elasticities 
which measure the distribution of the effects from the policy changes over time. These char-
acterize the short-run dynamics of investment and their time-structure is based considerably 
on the particular econometric method adopted for the estimation of the model.  To this issue 
we will return in due course.  
3. Data, definitions and measurement of the variables 
All variables relate to the business sector of the United States and the data for their compilation 
come from: the archives of the U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); the database of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St’ Louis; the data base of the federal reserve board of Governors; and 
the database of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Which variable comes from which 
data source is reported in the notes section of Table A-1 in the Appendix. As depicted in this ta-
ble, the time length of the series covers the period 1947-2015. 
 Colum 1 in Table 1 displays the symbols of the variables, the logarithms of which enter in 
the estimations of equation (4). Column 2 gives the numbers of columns of the series from 
Table A-1 in the Appendix that were employed in the derivation of the corresponding varia-
                                                   
4
    According to Bitros, Flytzanis (2009) this happens whenever the said policies are upgrading for the particular 
fixed assets under consideration.  
Table 1 about here 
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bles, and column 3 reports the definitions of the variables. Observe that for the rates of re-
placement, interest and taxes there are more than one definition and measurement. As these 
are alternative policy instruments, in the estimations we shall experiment with them in search 
of the best policy instrumentation. Also, it should be noted that all non-price variables refer to 
the private nonresidential U.S economy.  
 Before turning to the estimation procedures and the results, a comment is in order regard-
ing a general conceptual problem with the data in hand. No doubt they are the best available, 
since they have been compiled by a reliable source using state-of-the-art methods. But they 
are aggregate and as such they are subject to the limitations of the aggregation problem dis 
cussed, say, in Zarembka (1975) and Brown, Chang (1976). Bitros (2008b) attempted to high-
light the difficulties involved and their implications and by so doing warn about the pitfalls 
associated with the use of aggregate data, particularly in the area of investment and capital. 
Hopefully, in this research, by focusing in addition to aggregate investment to its three major 
constituent components, we convey our awareness of the problem and the need for testing our 
inferences and policy prescriptions at all possible levels.    
4. Issues of estimation and results   
Equation (4) is like any other demand equation in economics. It relates the demand for in-
vestment to output and several price variables, including the key policy variables of the inter-
est rate, the tax rate and the capital replacement rate. Thus, as is commonly the case, the main 
issue that arises is how to estimate the long-run (LR) and short-run (SR) elasticities, together 
with their standard errors in a way that will permit us to draw valid inferences regarding the 
possible effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy policies that are effected by means of the 
corresponding instruments. 
If we were to fit (4) in the log-level form in which it stands presently by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), the estimates could be subject to the “spurious regression phenomenon” first 
described in Granger and Newbold (1974). This phenomenon refers to the possibility that the 
OLS parameter estimates do not converge to constants and hence the usual t- and F-ratio test 
statistics do not have even the limiting distributions. For, if used, they would generate spuri-
ous inferences. The problem arises fundamentally because the variables in levels are most 
commonly nonstationary and this explains why many researchers apply OLS in the first-
difference form of the variables.   
However, in more recent years the practice of taking the first differences in order to attain 
stationarity in the levels of the variables has come under severe criticism. The reason is that, if 
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the levels of the nonstationary variables are cointegrated, as discussed in Engle and Granger 
(1987), then such regressions should not be estimated in first difference form, because regres-
sions in the levels of cointegrated variables can be consistently estimated by OLS without be-
ing subject to the spurious regression phenomenon. In the light of the above considerations, 
before a decision was made as to the proper method of estimation, all variables were tested 
for stationarity. Table 2 displays the results from this test. The p-values of the Phillips-Perron 
test in the lower part of this table indicate that all variables are stationary in the first differ-
ences. Therefore, potentially, in the absence of cointegration in the variables entering into 
equation (4), the estimation might be effected by applying OLS.  Relevant to resolving these 
issues are the results in Table 3. As recommended by the Engle-Granger approach, we es-
timated all four equations by OLS, extracted from them the residuals, and finally we run on 
the latter Phillips-Perron tests to determine the presence or not of cointegration. The first step 
in upper part of the table shows the estimates of the equations from which the tested residuals 
resulted, whereas the second step in the lower part displays the p-values of the statistics. From 
them we confirmed the presence of cointegration in all four equations and on this ground we 
determined that the proper way to estimate the four equations was to adopt the Error Correc-
tion Method (ECM). 
 The error-correction investment demand model consists of two parts. The first part is the 
long-run equilibrium investment demand function represented by (5) as rewritten and aug-
mented below with the addition of the long-run random disturbance term e :  
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Equation (5) says that the demand for investment by firms, say structures, stru, depends on 
output as measured by the gross value added, gva, three policy variables represented by its 
own replacement rate, ,  for 1,2hstru h  , some instruments standing for the rates of interest 
and taxes, ,  for 1,2,3,4jr r j    and ,  for =1,2ku u k  , and the difference in the unit price of 
Table 2 about here 
Table 3 about here 
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structures minus the unit price of output, dstru-dgva. The set of parameters 
1 2 3 4 5( , , , , )      
give respectively the .long-run elasticities of the investment demand for structures with re-
spect to output, the policy variables, and the relative prices.   
 Regarding next the second part of the model, this is a dynamic error-correction equation of 
the following form:  
1 2 3
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In this equation all variables are as defined above; tv  is the short-run random disturbance 
term; D stands for the difference operator; ,  for 1,2,...6in i  , represents the number of lags in 
each of the six variables; and 1te  is the lagged value of the long-run random disturbance. 
Equation (6) gives the short-run determinants of investment demand. We see that they include 
past changes in the dependent variable, current and past values of output, and so on. The pa-
rameter  that multiplies the term 1te   is the error correction coefficient.  The meaning of this 
term is that investment in, say, structures, stru, because of unforeseen lags in the planning and 
construction stages does not match always the levels judged as optimal by firms on the basis 
of their long term factors specified in equation (1). By implication, in the short-run, the firms 
adjust the levels of their structures to correct any disequilibrium from their long-run desired 
levels. The parameter    in equation (5) measures the impact of such disequilibria in explain-
ing the short-run movements in the level of structures in place. 
 In the above discussion it is important to note that the precision with which the parameter 
 is estimated depends crucially on the stationarity or not of the long run disturbance error 
term 1te  ; For, if these errors are serially correlated, the size of this parameter will be smaller 
the higher the coefficient of serial correlation. This explains why before adopting the ECM 
approach to estimation it is imperative to establish that the series of long-run errors is station-
ary. In our case the test statistics shown in the lower part of Table 3 provide enough assurance 
that the errors in all four equations are stationary, and that therefore the ECM is the proper 
method of estimation.  
Solving equation (5) for the lagged error term 1te   and substituting into equation (6) to-
gether with the notation from equation (4) we obtain equation (7) below:  
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This is the error-correction-model we estimate by OLS using the data for structures, equip-
ment, intangibles, and total investment. In this model the parameter λ measures how devia-
tions from the long term equilibrium relationship impact the short-run movements in the de-
mand for investment.  
 Table 4 displays the results. On inspection it turns out that from an econometric point view 
they are closed to those that we might have expected. With a few exceptions, the variables in 
the long- and in the short-run part of the model enter with statistically significant coefficients; 
the values of the alternative test statistics D-W and Breusch-Godfrey assure us that the size of the 
coefficients and their t-ratios are free from biases due to serial correlation in the data; the signs of the 
coefficients are consistent with our prior expectations from theory; and the explanatory power 
of the equations is very high. Moreover, a particularly important finding is the presence of 
policy instruments across equations and segments of the model. To capture the influence of 
fiscal policy, aside from having experimented with two tax rate instruments, we run the esti-
mations with one and two time lags and leads in the corresponding series. Invariably leading 
the series performed better, thus implying that it is not so much the tax rate that influences in-
vestment, but its anticipations. Also, from among the two tax rate instruments, we found that the 
one measured without inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustment gave consistent-
ly better results. With regard to monetary policy, we tried four instruments. The one that per-
formed admissibly was the Fed’s discount rate for primary credits. But even so, certain qualifi-
cations are in order. First, notice that the coefficients of 2tr in the equations for structure and 
equipment lie at the borderline of statistical significance. This may render the effectiveness of 
monetary policy at that level quite uncertain. Second, across all equations the coefficients of the 
discount rate are less than one sixth the sizes of those pertaining to the tax rate 1 1tu  . No doubt 
Table 4 about here 
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this difference will show up in the form of far smaller elasticities of investment with respect to 
the interest rate than the tax rate. Yet it is useful to have in mind where this disparity comes 
from. Thirdly, in view of these limitations, one might think that monetary policy may exercise 
its predominant effects indirectly through the user cost and in particular the parameter
2 . We 
shall see shortly that this is not the case, because the estimated elasticity of the user cost with 
respect to the interest rate is also much lower than that of the tax rate
3 .  
     The above assessments should not be interpreted to imply that we experienced no disap-
pointments at the estimation stage. For one, notice the absence of monetary and fiscal policy 
instruments from the equation of intangibles. Despite the time and effort we devoted to the 
estimation of this equation, investment in intellectual property products appears to be driven 
by two forces: predominantly by output or gross-value-added, and secondarily by the re-
placement rate.  In our view both findings can be rationalized by an appeal to the nature of 
these products and the high rate by which they become obsolete over time. But such a discus-
sion would take us far afield. For this reason we shall turn now to the elasticities which are im-
plied by the estimated investment equations.  
 Relevant to them are the results exhibited in Table 5. The figures in the first row give the 
elasticity of substitution of capital for labor, i.e. . The additive inverse of this coincides with 
the elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost and as we pointed out in the introduc-
tion its precise value has escaped research efforts. Depending on the level of aggregation, 
we observe that it varies from a low of 0.46 for equipment to as high as 3.33 for intangibles, 
with its value for overall investment estimated at 0.84, i.e. about 15% above the upper 
bound of the range most frequently reported in the literature. Here then we have some pos-
sible explanation for its elusiveness. If the composition of investment changes over time, 
the value of this elasticity would be expected to shift upwards or downwards, depending on 
which of the included fixed assets loose or gain share in overall investment. In the U.S. 
business sector since the 1960s total investment has tilted against structures and in favor of 
intangibles, which we found to have almost five times the capital-labor substitution relative 
to structures. Hence, no wonder that Eisner, Nadiri (1968) found the value of σ to lie in the 
vicinity of 0.2 and researchers in more recent studies have reported it to be close to 0.7.      
 The second row of the table gives the elasticity of investment with respect to output. Again 
we observe considerable variation along the scale of disaggregation, with the lowest value of 
Table 5 about here 
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  computed for structures and the highest for equipment, with that of total investment in be-
tween. From the data on the average ages of the three types of fixed assets under considera-
tion we know that structures has the highest economic longevity, followed by equipment and 
lastly by intangibles. On the other hand, from the computed values of ρ it turns out that the 
output elasticity of structures is lowest, followed by intangibles and equipment, which have 
roughly the same output elasticity. So it is tempting to surmise that perhaps the output elas-
ticities are inversely related to the longevity of investments. For, if this is actually the case, 
this evidence would go a long way in explaining the substantial shift in recent decades in the 
composition of business investment in the U.S away from structures and towards equipment, 
and particularly intangibles like computer software. Moreover, the finding that the standard 
errors of these elasticities are exceedingly small across all types of fixed investments should 
be reassuring about their robustness and stability. 
 Of singular interest are also the elasticities that relate to the rates of replacement, interest 
and taxes.  Looking across the rows labeled by an initial , notice that all such elasticities are 
significant at high levels of confidence. But the innovation is not in these findings. We knew 
and expected them from earlier studies, like for example by Bitros, Kelejian (1974), which es-
tablished that retirements relate affirmatively to gross investment. Rather the innovation lies in 
two other aspects. The first of them is that that the replacement rate enters into the investment 
equations directly and indirectly through the user cost. To highlight the implications, consider the 
equation of total investment and contemplate a one-time increase in the replacement rate by 
10%.  From the elasticity of 1tinv   in the extreme right column in Table 5, we see that 
overall investment would increase by 9.08%. But the replacement rate enters also through 
the user cost and channels its influence via the parameter 1 . In the column for total invest-
ment we see that this parameter takes the value 0.111. Therefore, since the user cost is in the 
denominator of equation (2), the presumed change in the replacement rate would increase 
overall investment by 7.97%.  As for the second aspect, this relates to the finding that the 
sum of the direct and indirect elasticities of the replacement rate varies with the type of pro-
ducer’s goods under consideration, being lowest for equipment and highest for intangibles. 
We do not wish to read too much into these differences. But if one were to suggest that they 
may spring from the differences in the uncertainty that accompanies the rates of technologi-
cal progress embodied in the corresponding classes of producer’s goods, we would be 
agreeable on the basis of the analytical results obtained, say, by Bitros (2008a).  
 Moving downwards in Table 5 we come across the row 2 1tr  .The figures in this row are the 
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elasticities of investment with respect to the Fed’s discount rate. From the standard errors of the 
ones in the equations for structures and equipment it follows that they are weakly statistically 
significant. Even worse, as we already pointed out above, in the equation for intangibles this 
coefficient is missing altogether, which implies that it was not found to be different from zero. 
By implication, we can say nothing with certainty about the effectiveness of monetary policy at 
this level of disaggregation. But regarding total investment monetary policy may be effective, 
albeit timidly. For, if the discount rate is reduced by 10%, total investment would be expected to 
increase directly and indirectly through the user cost by only 0.95 %. On the contrary, fiscal 
policy enacted through changes in the business tax rate may be effective at all levels of aggrega-
tion and to a large extent.  To ascertain this it suffices to look across the row labeled
1 1tu  . We 
see that the elasticities are statistically significant with high levels of confidence and that their 
sizes are many times those pertaining to the interest rate. In this case, for example, a 10% reduc-
tion in the business tax rate would increase overall investment, again directly and indirectly 
through the user cost, by 4.96%. Hence, on account of policy certainty and effectiveness, the 
evidence favors fiscal over monetary initiatives.   
 In conclusion, the results are quite encouraging both on technical and substantive grounds. 
Econometrically they meet all standard criteria of acceptability and the elasticities to which 
they lead shed considerable light to outstanding issues in the investment literature. More spe-
cifically, the disaggregation into structures, equipment and intangibles has proved advanta-
geous in resolving the long standing issue that surrounds the nature of the replacement rate; 
the disaggregation of the user cost to its constituent components has unlocked the potential to 
get a glimpse through its veil to the indirect influence they exert on investment; and the 
adopted method of estimation has enable on the one hand the identification and the estimation 
of all parameters involved, and on the other, the discrimination between the long term and 
short term effects of the main determinants of investment. On the substantive plane, the evi-
dence has shown that the first best channel to increase investment are policies to raise the rate 
of replacement by business firms, whereas reducing the business tax rate is second best and 
reducing the discount rate is by far the third best choice. With these findings in hand, we are 
ready now to look into their implications.   
  
5. Business investment and economic growth 
Observe from Table 4 that the variable of gross value added is present everywhere with statis-
tically significant and consistently-signed coefficients. It follows that the demand for output 
does matter to business firms and that this evidence strengthens the case of all those who ar-
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gue that the deceleration of economic growth in recent decades is due partly to the decelera-
tion of investment because of insufficient aggregate demand. But given that aggregate de-
mand links to economic growth mainly through net investment, which commands a relatively 
small share in total investment, it would take considerable strengthening of the aggregate de-
mand in the short run in order to achieve a moderate stimulus of overall business investment 
in the long run. Moreover, while considering policies for boosting economic growth through 
this channel, effectiveness may be enhanced by raising output demand through those of the 
three producer’s goods whose demand is relatively more elastic, and also by striving to avoid 
adverse changes in the relative prices, because they are related negatively to investment in all 
three types of producer’s goods.  
 Paying attention to changes in relative prices is advisable because of the evidence from 
Table 4 that they affect the composition of the capital stock, which in turn influences the 
productivity of capital and thereby economic growth. Relevant to this point is Figure 1 below 
which displays the changes in relative prices and quantities of producer’s goods in the U.S. 
business sector since 1929. From Figure 1(a) it turns out that sine the 1960s structures became 
continuously more expensive relative to equipment and intangibles. According to Table 5 the 
elasticities of investment with respect to the relative prices coincide with the additive inverse 
of the elasticities of substitution of capital for labor displayed in the first row. For example, 
for structures we see that given a 10% increase in their  relative prices, investment in this 
fixed asset would decline by 6%, whereas an equiproportional decline in the relative prices of 
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equipment, intangibles and overall fixed assets would increase investment by 4.6, 33.3, and 
8.35 percent, respectively. Thus, as the quantity of structures declined and those of equipment 
and intangibles increased according to Figure 1(b), the composition of the capital stock tilted 
against the former and in favor of latter, particularly from the early 1980s when with the advent 
of globalization it became increasingly beneficial for business firms to outsource the construc-
tion of machinery and intangibles from third countries. We believe that these developments 
rendered the composition of capital stock increasingly unbalanced, thus leading to a decelera-
tion of overall investment and a slowdown in the productivity of capital. That a serious break in 
this process took place in 1980 we suspect from the significance of the dummy variable in the 
equation for equipment in Table 4. 
  Turning next to fiscal policy, this channel is activated by initiatives in two fronts. Namely 
by changing the statutory business tax rate and/or by reforming the regime that pertains to de-
preciation allowances for tax purposes. Regarding the changes in the statutory tax rate, ac-
cording to our results, the effects would be transmitted to investment directly through the 
presence of the effective tax rate in the investment equations and indirectly through the user 
cost. The estimated impact of such changes on total investment is sizable, since a 10% change 
in the expected effective tax rate would lead to a 5%  percent change in total investment in 
the opposite direction.
5
 By contrast, reforming the provisions of depreciation allowances af-
fects investment through the replacement rate, the impact of which is more powerful relative-
ly to that of the tax rate, since a 10% change in the replacement rate would change total in-
vestment by 8%  in the same direction. To understand the implications of these findings, 
one does not need to look further than the debates that took place in the U.S. following the 
presentation by the Joint Committee on Taxation (2014) of their tax reform plan, which pro-
vided for repealing partially the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) in 
exchange for a 5-percentage point reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate. For, soon after the 
initial deliberations, and under the weight of the submitted scientific evidence, it became clear that 
the 5-percentage point reduction in the corporate tax rate was insufficient to counterbalance the 
negative effects on investment from abolishing even partially the provisions under the MACRS 
framework and the tax reform plan has remained ever since in limbo.  
 Thus, from this incident and our results it follows that the first best policy for fiscal authorities 
is to ease the conditions of depreciation allowances. By doing so, ceteris paribus, business firms 
                                                   
5
    Notice that the variable 
t
u  enters in the investment equations with a one period forward lag. By implication, 
its coefficients should reflect the expectations by business firms of how government actions at  1t   may in-
fluence the effective tax rate at  and 1t t  . 
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would be given an extra incentive to increase replacement investment and by modernizing the 
productive capacity of their plant and equipment raise productivity and hence economic growth. 
Compared to this policy, the reduction of the statutory tax rate is inferior because: (a) the linkage 
of the statutory to the effective tax rate is uncertain, and (b) the predicted stimulus of investment 
from the reduction of the effective tax rate is about 60% the size of that which would be expected 
from an equivalent change in the replacement rate. Lastly, the policy of trying to fine-tune the 
trade-off that exists between changes in the statutory business tax rate and changes in the provi-
sions of depreciation allowances is third best because it posits a problem exceedingly difficult to 
solve as it mixes the technical issues of the recovery of capital under condition of technological 
uncertainty with the politics that surround all the time the public budget.    
 Now let us switch to monetary policy. Recall from the equation in the extreme right col-
umn of Table 4 that the federal discount rate enters with a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient. Also, recall from Table 5 that the elasticities of investment with respect to the dis-
count rate are of the right sign but relatively low. Hence, we may surmise that, while mone-
tary policy may have influenced the trends that dominated business investment in the post war 
period, the extent of this influence should be interpreted to imply that it has taken protracted 
and sizeable changes in the discount rate in order to bring about moderate changes in business 
investment in the opposite direction. Still, this finding leaves open the question of the possible 
channels through which monetary policy changes link to the process of economic growth, and 
this makes it imperative to look into the question of how they filter through replacement and 
net investment, which are the main avenues through which new technology enters into the 
economy and boosts productivity and economic growth. Figure 2 exhibits the five year mov-
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ing average series of the federal discount rate and the ratios of replacement and net investment 
to the capital stock in the business sector of the U.S economy. The five year moving average 
series of the corporate bond yield has the same general shape as the curve of the discount rate, 
so it is reasonable to assume that expectations about the discount rate drive the changes in the 
corporate bond yield and the whole term structure of interest rates on which investment deci-
sions are taken. Looking at this figure, one cannot fail to notice that in the period before the 
1980 the federal discount rate rose almost in tandem with replacement investment, whereas 
since then the two series have been declining in a roughly similar fashion. From Table 6 it 
turns out that their correlation is 0.757, which is very high to be spurious. Consequently, the 
inverse relationship we found earlier between the discount rate and total investment should 
spring from an inverse relationship between the discount rate and net investment. But why 
does replacement investment move consistently and beyond any doubt in direct relation to the 
discount rate is not profound and it needs some explanation. We believe that, as monetary au-
thorities raise (reduce) the cost of credit, the user cost of capital increases (decreases) and 
business firms accelerate (slow down) the replacement of their productive facilities just for 
rational user cost minimizing purposes. Doing so though reduces (increases) the average age 
of capital and its productivity increases (declines), because the capital stock incorporates at a 
faster (slower) rate the most recent technological advances. If this explanation is correct, we 
would expect the correlation of the productivity of capital curve to coincide roughly with the 
curve of the replacement investment in Figure 2, because total investment is dominated by the 
share of replacement investment.  
 Figure 3 displays the five year moving average series of certain key variables to get a 
glimpse into the possible effects of monetary policy on economic growth. Recall that Total 
 18 
Factor Productivity (TFP) is defined as a weighted average of the ratio of output to labor input 
and the ratio of output to capital input. Here we focus on the latter driver of economic growth. 
In Figure 3 the ratio of output to capital input is represented by the green colored line and it has 
been derived by dividing the gross value added by capital years. Given that capital has two di-
mensions, i.e. quantity and useful life, we believe that by reckoning capital in terms of capital 
years, we obtain a more accurate index of capital input. Now looking at the curves labeled 
“productivity of capital’ and ‘ratio of replacement investment’, we observe that they are corre-
lated positively to such extent that their correlation from Table 6  stands at 0.9817.  Hence, with a 
comfortable degree of confidence, we may conclude that the contribution of capital to economic 
growth is driven mainly by the rate of replacement investment. As replacement accelerates and 
the average age of capital declines, new technological advances are adopted at a faster rate, and 
hence, the rising productivity of capital boosts economic growth. When the opposite trends take 
hold, as in the years since 1980, replacement investment decelerates the average useful life of 
capital increases, and the productivity of capital declines.  
In Figure 3 we show also the curve of the five year moving average series of the federal 
discount rate. Comparing its shape to the other two curves we observe that all three curves are 
highly correlated. From Table 6 we see that their correlation is a little over 0.75. Consequent-
ly, even though monetary policy may exert some limited influence on economic growth by 
linking inversely the discount rate to net investment, the bulk of its influence is channeled by 
linking directly the discount rate to replacement investment, most likely in the particular 
manner that we explained above.  
Provided that we are right and the discount rate links directly to economic growth through 
the replacement policies of business firms, monetary policies in advanced economies should 
be reviewed and revised in this light. For, it is quite possible that the reduction in the discount 
rate since the 1980s may have contributed negatively to economic growth by inducing busi-
ness firms to slow down replacement, retarding the incorporation of new technological ad-
vances in the capital stock and driving productivity to long term decline. The main point we 
are making by putting forward this view is that net investment in advanced countries is only a 
small share of total investment and that the bulk of productivity enhancing technological 
change enters into the economy via the process of replacement. By suggesting this explana-
tion for the investment related slowdown of productivity in recent decades, we are aware that 
Table 6 about here 
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we take a different path from that of world renowned researchers like Gordon (2015a, 2015b)) 
who stress the importance of net investment. We believe that by bringing into purview the 
possible effects of policies through the user cost of capital to replacement investment, we ex-
pand our understanding of the reasons for the persistent decline of productivity and the trend 
towards secular stagnation in advanced economies.  
6. Summary of findings and conclusions 
The focus in this research has been on the elasticities of investment in the U.S. business sector  
and their policy implications. Using the rich set of data that have been compiled by the U. S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis for the period 1947-2015, we estimated investment equations 
for three types of fixed assets and three policy instruments. In particular, we disaggregated 
investment into structures, equipment and intellectual property products, and the policy in-
struments into the rate of replacement, the interest rate and the tax rate.  Additionally, we es-
timated an equation for total investment.  
 All estimations were performed by means of the error-correction-estimating technique, 
which enables in one stroke the estimation of the long and the short-run elasticities, and we 
obtained results at both the aggregate and disaggregate levels that pass the standard statistical 
criteria with comfortable margins of confidence. In the long run we found that the policy in-
struments influence investment in structures, equipment and intangibles differently, both di-
rectly and indirectly through the user cost. On this ground we concluded that, if the policy in-
struments had been subsumed under the user cost, as done traditionally, their joint impact 
most likely would have been miscalculated. Furthermore, our results show that in all three 
types of fixed assets considered the overall effects on investment from changes in the rate of 
replacement are generally stronger than those from equiproportional changes in the tax rate 
and the discount rate.  
 In their vast majority the elasticities turned out to be statistically significant and generally 
of the right sign.  At the level of total investment, we found the following elasticities: 
 Elasticity of substitution of capital for labor, coinciding with the additive inverse of 
the elasticity of with respect to the user cost, as well as the relative prices:  0.835.  
 Elasticity of output or gross-value added:  0.826.  
 Direct elasticities with respect to the rates of replacement, interest and taxation:  
0.908, -0.043, -0.226.   
 Indirect elasticities with respect to the rates of replacement, interest and taxation: 
0.111, 0.052, 0.270.  
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 Overall elasticities with respect to the rates of replacement, interest and taxation: 
0.797, -0.095, -0.496.
6
  
Drawing on the marked differences among the overall elasticities, we ranked policies aimed at 
the replacement rate as first best, the policies aimed at the tax rate as second best and the poli-
cies aimed at the interest rate as third best.  
  To highlight the significance of our results, we investigated their implications for econom-
ic growth by focusing on four policy channels, i.e. aggregate demand, relative prices, and fis-
cal and monetary policies. With reference to the first channel, we found some evidence in 
support of the claims that the deceleration of economic growth in recent decades may be due 
to lack of adequate aggregate demand. Having established that investment is directly and 
strongly related to gross value added, we suggested that policies aimed at boosting aggregate 
demand should target investment in those producer’s goods that are more output elastic and in 
any case watch out for adverse developments in the front of relative prices. The reason being 
that we found relative prices to be negatively related to investment and to affect the composi-
tion of the capital stock, which is linked to the productivity of capital, and hence to economic 
growth.  Finally, and to our view most importantly, looking through the veil of the user cost, 
we discovered that fiscal and monetary policies, as instrumented by the effective tax rate and 
the depreciation allowances, the former, and the discount rate, the latter, link to investment 
directly and indirectly. By reference to the size of the respective elasticities, fiscal policies 
channeled through the replacement rate are first best, whereas fiscal policies channeled 
through the statutory tax rate are second best. We have ranked monetary policies as third best 
on two grounds. First, because of the weak effects of the discount rate, and secondly because 
of the way it appears to link to net and replacement investment. The identification and estima-
tion of the latter linkage highlights the possibility that monetary policy may be not only inef-
fective in stimulating investment, and hence economic growth, but even fall into the trap of 
the law of unintended consequences by  slowing replacement investment down, since the use-
ful life of capital is negatively related to the discount rate. Clearly, if this finding is confirmed 
by further studies, it will go a long way towards explaining why, contrary to expectations, re-
placement investment has not reversed its downward trend since 1980, despite the race of 
monetary policy to the zero bound of the discount rate.   
                                                   
6
    Given that the expression of the user cost is in the denominator of equation (2), these elasticities were ob-
tained by adding the values of direct elasticities with the additive inverse values of the indirect elasticities.  
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8. Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Symbols and definitions of the variables 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
gvat 1/6 Gross value added δstru2t 15 Replacement rate of investment
2
 
strut 2/7 Investment in structures δeq2t 16 Replacement rate of investment
2
 
eqt 3/8 Investment in equipment δint2t 17 Replacement rate of investment
2
 
intt 4/9 Investment in intangibles δinv2t 18 Replacement rate of investment
2
 
invt 5/10 Total investment r1t 19 Effective  federal  funds  rate 
pgvat 6 Deflator of gva   r2t 20 Discount rate 
dstrut 7 Deflator of stru   r3t 21 10-year  government bond yield 
deqt 8 Deflator of eq   r4t 22 Moody's  Baa corporate bond yield 
dintt 9 Deflator of int   u1t 23 Rate of corporate taxes
3
 
dinvt 10 Deflator of inv   u2t 24  Rate of corporate taxes
4
 
δstru1t 11 Replacement rate of structures
1
    
δeq1t 12 Replacement rate of equipment
1
    
δint1t 13 Replacement rate of intangibles
1
    
δinv1t 14 Replacement rate of investment
1
    
Notes 
1. The calculation of these replacement rates are based on the current-cost average ages of the corresponding 
types of investment. 
2. The calculation of these replacement rates are based on the historical-cost average ages of the correspond-
ing types of investment. 
3. Without inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustment. 
4. With inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustment. 
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Table 2: Phillips-Perron tests on the  levels and first differences of the variables1,2 
 
 
Levels 
 
Series PP t-Statistic P-Value Series PP t-Statistic P-Value 
gvat -1.760 0.4006 r1t -1.969 0.3002 
strut -2.366 0.1516 r2t -0.835 0.8085 
 eqt   0.038 0.9616 r3t -1.013 0.7485 
intt -1.540 0.5135 r4t -1.723 0.4195 
inv -0.804 0.8180 u1t -1.858 0.3522 
δstru1t -2.361 0.1531 u2t -1.313 0.6230 
δeq1t -2.735 0.0682 dstrut-dgvat   0.445 0.9831 
δint1t -1.412 0.5766 deqt-dgvat   1.995 0.9987 
δinv1t -3.331 0.0135 dintt-dgvat   1.578 0.9978 
δstru2t
2 -3.503 0.0079 dinvt-dgvat   1.005 0.9943 
δeq2t -1.734 0.4136    
δint2t -1.593 0.4873       
δinv2t -4.047 0.0012    
 
First differences 
 
Dgvat -7.609 0.0000 Dr1t -6.949 0.0000 
Dstrut -5.875 0.0000 Dr2t -6.562 0.0000 
 Deqt -7.020 0.0000 Dr3t -7.755 0.0000 
Dintt -6.495 0.0000 Dr4t -5.796 0.0000 
Dinvt -6.264 0.0000 Du1t -7.496 0.0000 
Dδstru1t
3 -2.737 0.0678 Du2t -6.182 0.0000 
Dδeq1t -6.203 0.0000 D(dstrut-dgvat) -4.632 0.0001 
Dδint1t -5.689 0.0000 D(deqt- dgvat) --3.767 0.0033 
Dδinv1t -4.101 0.0010 D(dintt-dgvat) -5.248 0.0000 
Dδstru2t
3 -2.583 0.0967 D(dinvt-dgvat) -4.206 0.0006 
Dδeq2t -6.238 0.0000    
Dδint2t -5.797 0.0000    
Dδinv2t -3.921 0.0019    
  Notes: 
1. If instead of the Phillips-Perron test we had used the Augmented Dicky-Fuller test, the conclusions 
would not have changed.  
2. In all cases the default lags computed endogenously by the test were 3. 
3. Observe that in this case the differencing of the variable worsens the value of the PP t-statistic. 
4. In these two cases, when the test was run with a trend, the values of the statistic were 
      (-5.046, 0.0002) and (-3.185, 0.0874). 
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Table 3: Test results for cointegration1   
 
 
Step A 
(OLS residuals from the four equations  
 
 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
strut eqt intt invt 
Constant -0.517 (-1.38) -1.391 (-4.28) -4.924 (-14.8) -0.667 (-1.43) 
gvat 0.656 (9.08) 1.107 (28.4) 1.972 (29.5) 0.954 (14.5) 
δstru2t 0.304 (1.74) …. …. …. 
δeq2t …. 0.701 3.99) …. …. 
δint2t …. …. 1.154 (3.78) …. 
δinv2t …. …. …. -0.337 (-2.21) 
r2t …. 0.034 (2.70) …. 0.038 (2.89) 
r4t 0.217 (3.18) …. -0.280 (-3.56)  
u2t 0.236 (2.39) …. -0.199 (-1.85) …. 
(dstrut-dgvat) -0.153 (-1.13) …. …. …. 
(deqt-dgvat) …. -1.003 (-10.4)  …. 
(dintt-dgvat) …. …. 0.728 (2.02) …. 
(dinvt-dgvat) …. …. …. -1.134 (-4.07) 
Dummyt -0.166 (-3.74) …. 0.077(1.46) -0.140 (-5.38) 
Adjusted  R2 0.971 0.996 0.997 0.996 
Root MSE 0.0710 0.0651 0.0787 0.0475 
 
Step B 
(Unit root tests on residuals) 
 
Phillips-Perron  t-
statistic 
strut eqt intt invt 
z(t) -4.547 -3.971 -3.461 -4.042 
p-value 0.0002 0.0016 0.0090 0.0012 
Notes: 
1. If instead of the Phillips-Perron test we had used the Augmented Dicky-Fuller test, the conclusions 
would not have changed.  
2.  
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Table 4: OLS estimates of equation (7) 
 
 
Variables 
Dependent Variables
1
 
Dstrut Deqt Dintt Dinvt 
Constant …. -0.967 (-4.64) …. …. 
strut-1 -0.452 (-5.05) …. …. …. 
eqt-1 …. -0.415 ((-4.34) … …. 
intt-1 …. …. -0.052 (-2.09) …. 
invt-1 …. ….  -0.368 (-5.01) 
gvat-1 0.286 (4.94) 0.584 (4.90) 0.068 (2.37) 0.305 (5.14) 
δstru2t-1 0.533 (6.14) ….  …. 
δeq2t-1 …. 0.358 (2.65)  …. 
δint2t-1 …. … 0.114 (1.82) …. 
δinv2t-1 …. … … 0.334 (6.07) 
r2t-1 -0.019 (-1.82) -0.011 (-1.65) … -0.016 (-3.04) 
u1t+1 -0.118 (-2.41) -0.084 (-2.49) … -0.083 (-2.30) 
(dstru-dgva)t-1 -0.273 (-3.39) …. … …. 
(deq-dgva)t-1 …. -0.191 (-2.03) … …. 
(dint-dgva) t-1 …. …. -0.137 (-1.30) …. 
(dinv-dgva) t-1 …. …. …. -0.308 (-3.23) 
Dstru t-1 0.179 (1.84) ….  …. 
Deq t-1 …. 0.206 (4.20)  …. 
Dinv t-1 …. …. …. 0.364 (5.11) 
Dgvat 1.176 (5.30) 2.086 (14.2) 0.655 (4.23) 1,285 (8.92) 
Dδstru2t 3.127 (5.77) …. …. …. 
Dδeq2t-1 …. 0.619 (2.41)  …. 
Dδint1t …. …. 1.298 (5.35) …. 
Dδinv2t …. …. …. 1.456 (5.12) 
Dr2t … 0.059 (6.25)   
Dr2t-1 0.056 (3.40) …. …. …. 
Du1t-1 …. 0.112 (2.38) …. …. 
Dummy …. -0037 (-2.06)   
R2 0.783 0.923 0.823 0.858 
R2-adjusted 0.744 0.907 0.806 0.835 
D-W 2.093 1.779 1.941 2.020 
Breusch-Godfrey 0.404 0.309 0.929 0.873 
Root MSE 0.039 0.026 0.035 0.028 
Notes : 
1. The numbers within the parentheses give the values of the t-statistic. 
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Table 5 : Elasticities implied by the long-run estimates of the model 
 
 
Investment
1
 
 
strut-1 eqt-1 intt-1 invt-1 
2,3   
0.603  
0.603 (0.177) 
0.461  
0.461 (0.144) 
2.621 
3.327 (1.044) 
0.835  
0.835 (0.157) 
ρ 
0.634  
0.634 (0.070) 
1.409 
1.409 (0.071) 
1.300 
1.129 (0.179) 
0.827  
0.827 (0.046) 
δstru2t-1 
1.181  
1.181 (0.123) 
…. …. …. 
δeq2t-1 …. 
0.863 
0.863 (0.071) 
…. …. 
δint2t-1 …. …. 
2.193 
1.964 (0.388) 
…. 
δinv2t-1 …. …. …. 
0.908  
0.908 (0.064) 
r2t-1 
-0.043 
-0.043 (0.028) 
-0.026 
-0.026 (0.018) 
…. 
-0.043  
-0.043 (0.017) 
u1t+1 
-0.261  
-0.261 (0.113) 
-0.204 
-0.204 (0.095) 
…. 
-0.226  
-0.226 (0.093) 
 User cost 
1 2 1t    -0.300 0.297 -0.455 0.111 
2 2 1tr   0.071 0.056 …. 0.052 
3 1 1tu   0.433 0.442 …. 0.270 
Notes: 
1. The numbers within the parenthesis are standard errors. These were computed by estimating 
the equations in Table 4 nonlinearly so as to factor out the parameter λ in equation (7). 
2. The estimates of the elasticities at the top of the rows were computed from the OLS esti-
mates shown in Table (4). Observe that in the equations for structures, equipment and total 
investment the linear and nonlinear estimates of the elasticities coincide, whereas in the 
equation for intangibles they differ considerably.    
3. Recall that the parameter σ is in the denominator of equation (2) and that therefore an in-
crease in the user cost leads to a decline in investment. 
 
 
 28 
 
 
Table 6: Correlation coefficients  
 Variables
1
 
 sminv smnetinv smrepinv smprod smdisrate 
sminv
2
 1.0000     
smnetinv
2
 0.7383 1.0000    
smrepinv
2
 0.9298 0.4381 1.0000   
smprod
3
 0.9251 0.4604 0.9817 1.0000  
smdisrate
2
  0.5938 0.0622 0.7574 0.7698 1.0000 
Notes: 
1. The symbol sm in front of the variables denotes their five year moving average. 
2. These series are ratios to the capital stock and they are defined as follows:  
inv=total investment, netinv=net investment, repinv=replacement investment,  
      prod=productivity, disrate=federal discount rate. 
3. This series is gross value added divided by capital years. 
29 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
 
Table A-1: Raw data used in the estimations 
 
 
 
Years 
 
Initial variables1,2 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
1.300 
1.366 
1.349 
1.486 
1.586 
1.628 
1.709 
1.686 
1.830 
1.862 
1.890 
1.856 
2.005 
2.043 
2.086 
2.221 
2.323 
2.468 
2.645 
2.826 
2.884 
3.030 
3.122 
3.122 
3.239 
3.450 
3.689 
3.634 
3.597 
3.839 
4.058 
4.316 
4.465 
4.422 
4.550 
4.419 
4.662 
5.071 
5.306 
5.499 
5.701 
5.945 
6.174 
6.273 
6.238 
6.501 
6.687 
7.013 
7.230 
7.568 
7.970 
8.378 
8.856 
0.081 
0.095 
0.092 
0.100 
0.120 
0.122 
0.136 
0.139 
0.152 
0.182 
0.190 
0.176 
0.181 
0.196 
0.197 
0.208 
0.212 
0.237 
0.283 
0.313 
0.315 
0.336 
0.377 
0.403 
0.427 
0.472 
0.550 
0.612 
0.614 
0.659 
0.746 
0.936 
1.177 
1.362 
1.673 
1.776 
1.543 
1.774 
1.945 
1.765 
1.742 
1.828 
1.937 
2.029 
1.836 
1.726 
1.772 
1.868 
2.073 
2.246 
2.503 
2.751 
2.839 
0.015 
0.017 
0.016 
0.018 
0.020 
0.020 
0.022 
0.021 
0.024 
0.026 
0.029 
0.025 
0.028 
0.030 
0.029 
0.032 
0.034 
0.039 
0.046 
0.053 
0.054 
0.059 
0.065 
0.066 
0.069 
0.079 
0.095 
0.104 
0.108 
0.121 
0.149 
0.181 
0.208 
0.216 
0.241 
0.235 
0.247 
0.292 
0.308 
0.318 
0.321 
0.347 
0.372 
0.372 
0.361 
0.382 
0.425 
0.476 
0.528 
0.565 
0.611 
0.660 
0.714 
0.002 
0.002 
0.002 
0.002 
0.002 
0.003 
0.004 
0.004 
0.004 
0.005 
0.006 
0.006 
0.007 
0.007 
0.008 
0.008 
0.009 
0.010 
0.011 
0.013 
0.014 
0.016 
0.017 
0.018 
0.019 
0.021 
0.023 
0.026 
0.028 
0.032 
0.036 
0.040 
0.048 
0.054 
0.065 
0.073 
0.081 
0.095 
0.105 
0.114 
0.120 
0.133 
0.150 
0.164 
0.179 
0.188 
0.197 
0.206 
0.227 
0.253 
0.288 
0.318 
0.364 
0.026 
0.029 
0.027 
0.030 
0.034 
0.035 
0.039 
0.039 
0.043 
0.050 
0.053 
0.049 
0.053 
0.056 
0.057 
0.061 
0.065 
0.072 
0.085 
0.097 
0.099 
0.108 
0.120 
0.125 
0.130 
0.147 
0.173 
0.191 
0.197 
0.219 
0.259 
0.315 
0.374 
0.407 
0.473 
0.485 
0.482 
0.564 
0.608 
0.608 
0.615 
0.662 
0.716 
0.739 
0.724 
0.742 
0.799 
0.869 
0.962 
1.043 
1.149 
1.253 
1.362 
0.158 
0.168 
0.167 
0.168 
0.180 
0.183 
0.185 
0.186 
0.188 
0.194 
0.201 
0.204 
0.206 
0.209 
0.210 
0.212 
0.214 
0.216 
0.219 
0.225 
0.231 
0.240 
0.251 
0.262 
0.273 
0.282 
0.297 
0.326 
0.357 
0.376 
0.399 
0.426 
0.462 
0.504 
0.550 
0.582 
0.601 
0.619 
0.636 
0.645 
0.657 
0.678 
0.702 
0.726 
0.746 
0.758 
0.776 
0.789 
0.803 
0.816 
0.828 
0.832 
0.837 
0.064 
0.072 
0.071 
0.072 
0.081 
0.083 
0.084 
0.083 
0.085 
0.092 
0.096 
0.095 
0.095 
0.095 
0.095 
0.095 
0.096 
0.097 
0.100 
0.104 
0.107 
0.113 
0.120 
0.128 
0.138 
0.148 
0.159 
0.181 
0.202 
0.212 
0.231 
0.253 
0.283 
0.309 
0.351 
0.379 
0.369 
0.373 
0.381 
0.389 
0.395 
0.412 
0.428 
0.442 
0.450 
0.450 
0.463 
0.479 
0.500 
0.513 
0.532 
0.557 
0.574 
0.331 
0.355 
0.369 
0.378 
0.410 
0.418 
0.419 
0.429 
0.434 
0.466 
0.492 
0.502 
0.511 
0.515 
0.512 
0.510 
0.507 
0.507 
0.508 
0.509 
0.521 
0.535 
0.550 
0.571 
0.589 
0.597 
0.607 
0.652 
0.752 
0.798 
0.847 
0.894 
0.952 
1.036 
1.111 
1.157 
1.161 
1.151 
1.151 
1.174 
1.182 
1.198 
1.221 
1.246 
1.267 
1.265 
1.250 
1.248 
1.235 
1.207 
1.173 
1.121 
1.077 
0.224 
0.235 
0.236 
0.241 
0.256 
0.259 
0.264 
0.266 
0.272 
0.283 
0.292 
0.299 
0.304 
0.308 
0.310 
0.312 
0.312 
0.317 
0.319 
0.324 
0.329 
0.340 
0.355 
0.372 
0.386 
0.397 
0.417 
0.456 
0.493 
0.514 
0.537 
0.565 
0.602 
0.649 
0.697 
0.737 
0.765 
0.786 
0.799 
0.805 
0.820 
0.845 
0.856 
0.865 
0.885 
0.875 
0.881 
0.884 
0.909 
0.912 
0.917 
0.913 
0.931 
0.197 
0.213 
0.218 
0.222 
0.243 
0.248 
0.251 
0.253 
0.257 
0.276 
0.289 
0.291 
0.295 
0.297 
0.296 
0.296 
0.296 
0.298 
0.302 
0.306 
0.314 
0.325 
0.339 
0.355 
0.371 
0.384 
0.400 
0.438 
0.496 
0.523 
0.558 
0.595 
0.643 
0.700 
0.767 
0.810 
0.809 
0.812 
0.820 
0.834 
0.844 
0.865 
0.885 
0.904 
0.921 
0.918 
0.920 
0.927 
0.936 
0.930 
0.925 
0.910 
0.902 
29.2 
28.7 
28.5 
27.9 
27.4 
27.1 
26.9 
26.6 
26.1 
25.7 
25.5 
25.4 
25.1 
25.0 
25.0 
24.9 
24.5 
24.2 
23.9 
23.8 
23.7 
23.5 
23.3 
23.1 
23.0 
22.8 
22.6 
22.6 
22.8 
22.9 
22.8 
22.6 
22.6 
22.6 
22.4 
22.7 
22.8 
22.8 
22.7 
22.7 
22.7 
22.7 
22.8 
22.8 
23.1 
23.4 
23.6 
23.8 
23.9 
23.9 
23.9 
23.9 
23.9 
7.6 
7.1 
7.0 
6.9 
6.8 
6.8 
6.8 
6.8 
6.9 
6.9 
6.9 
7.1 
7.2 
7.2 
7.3 
7.3 
7.3 
7.2 
7.0 
6.7 
6.6 
6.5 
6.5 
6.5 
6.6 
6.6 
6.5 
6.5 
6.7 
6.7 
6.8 
6.7 
6.6 
6.7 
6.7 
6.8 
7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
7.1 
7.1 
7.2 
7.3 
7.3 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
7.4 
7.4 
7.3 
7.1 
7.0 
6.8 
5.3 
5.4 
5.5 
5.6 
5.6 
5.6 
5.4 
5.4 
5.3 
5.1 
5.1 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
4.9 
4.8 
4.8 
4.8 
4.8 
4.9 
4.9 
4.9 
4.9 
4.9 
4.9 
4.8 
4.8 
4.7 
4.6 
4.5 
4.4 
4.4 
4.3 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.3 
4.3 
4.3 
4.2 
4.1 
4.0 
20.1 
19.5 
19.3 
19 
18.7 
18.6 
18.3 
18.2 
18 
17.7 
17.4 
17.3 
17.1 
16.9 
16.9 
16.7 
16.5 
16.3 
15.9 
15.4 
15.1 
14.9 
14.7 
14.6 
14.7 
14.6 
14.6 
14.7 
14.6 
14.7 
14.5 
14.4 
14.2 
14.1 
13.9 
13.9 
14.1 
14.1 
13.9 
13.8 
13.9 
13.9 
14 
13.9 
14 
14.2 
14.4 
14.5 
14.5 
14.5 
14.4 
14.4 
14.2 
 30 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
9.253 
9.313 
9.480 
9.783 
10.225 
10.612 
10.948 
11.177 
11.051 
10.598 
10.933 
11.164 
11.487 
11.744 
12.091 
12.465 
3.181 
3.297 
2.829 
2.818 
3.018 
3.456 
4.156 
4.969 
5.524 
4.382 
3.620 
3.816 
4.480 
4.636 
5.307 
5.073 
0.766 
0.712 
0.660 
0.669 
0.719 
0.791 
0.856 
0.886 
0.825 
0.644 
0.732 
0.838 
0.938 
0.983 
1.041 
1.086 
0.410 
0.413 
0.406 
0.421 
0.442 
0.475 
0.505 
0.538 
0.563 
0.551 
0.564 
0.592 
0.622 
0.648 
0.680 
0.718 
1.494 
1.454 
1.349 
1.372 
1.463 
1.612 
1.776 
1.921 
1.941 
1.633 
1.658 
1.812 
2.008 
2.094 
2.251 
2.311 
0.853 
0.868 
0.874 
0.886 
0.907 
0.935 
0.960 
0.983 
0.997 
1.000 
1.012 
1.033 
1.053 
1.069 
1.086 
1.093 
0.596 
0.628 
0.654 
0.678 
0.729 
0.821 
0.921 
0.976 
1.023 
1.000 
0.988 
1.019 
1.059 
1.081 
1.122 
1.122 
1.054 
1.023 
1.003 
0.985 
0.984 
0.986 
0.983 
0.986 
0.987 
1.000 
0.980 
0.989 
0.999 
1.001 
1.005 
1.013 
0.961 
0.964 
0.954 
0.952 
0.951 
0.960 
0.975 
0.992 
1.008 
1.000 
1.005 
1.019 
1.030 
1.038 
1.048 
1.056 
0.907 
0.904 
0.900 
0.899 
0.911 
0.938 
0.966 
0.986 
1.003 
1.000 
0.991 
1.005 
1.022 
1.030 
1.044 
1.051 
23.8 
23.9 
23.9 
24.0 
23.9 
23.9 
23.9 
23.9 
24.1 
24.6 
25.1 
25.5 
25.9 
26.3 
26.7 
27.0 
6.7 
6.7 
6.8 
6.9 
7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
6.9 
7.1 
7.3 
7.5 
7.5 
7.4 
7.3 
7.3 
7.2 
4.0 
4.0 
4.1 
4.1 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.3 
4.4 
4.4 
4.4 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
14.1 
14.2 
14.4 
14.6 
14.9 
15.1 
15.2 
15.2 
15.3 
15.5 
15.7 
15.9 
16 
16 
16.1 
16.1 
Notes 
1. Unless specifically noted, all data in this table have been extracted from the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA) published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
2. Explanation of definitions and particular sources of variables by number of column: 
1. Gross value added in trillions of current dollars, Table 1.3.5, line 2. 
2. Gross investment in private nonresidential structures in billions of current dollars, Table 5.3.5, line3. 
3. Gross investment in private nonresidential equipment in billions of current dollars, Table 5.3.5, line 9. 
4. Gross investment in private intellectual property products in billions of current dollars, Table 5.3.5, line 16. 
5. Gross private nonresidential investment in billions of current dollars, Table 5.3.5, line 2. 
6. Price index for gross value added in the business sector, 2009=1, Table 1.3.4, line 2. 
7. Price index for nonresidential private fixed structures, 2009=1, Table 5.3.4, line 3. 
8. Price index for nonresidential private equipment, 2009=1, Table 5.3.4, line 9. 
9. Price index for private intellectual property products, 2009=1, Table 5.3.4, line 16. 
10. Price index for nonresidential private investment, 2009=1, Table 5.3.4, line 2. 
11. Current-cost average age of private nonresidential structures, Table 2.9, line 36. 
12. Current-cost average age of private nonresidential equipment, Table 2.9, line 3. 
13. Current-cost average age of private nonresidential intellectual property products, Table 2.9, line 77. 
14. Current-cost average age of private nonresidential investment, Table 4.9, line 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
Table A-1: Continued from above 
 
 
 
Years 
 
Variables1,2 
 
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24  
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
19.7 
18.7 
18.1 
17.4 
16.6 
16.0 
15.4 
15.0 
14.5 
14.0 
13.5 
13.3 
13.1 
13.0 
12.9 
12.8 
12.7 
12.6 
12.4 
12.2 
12.1 
12.0 
11.9 
11.7 
11.6 
11.5 
11.3 
11.1 
11.0 
10.9 
10.8 
10.5 
10.1 
9.7 
9.2 
8.9 
8.9 
8.9 
8.8 
8.9 
9.0 
9.2 
9.3 
9.4 
9.7 
10.0 
10.3 
10.6 
10.8 
10.9 
11.0 
6.1 
5.5 
5.3 
5.2 
5.1 
5.1 
5.1 
5.2 
5.2 
5.2 
5.2 
5.3 
5.4 
5.5 
5.6 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.5 
5.4 
5.3 
5.3 
5.2 
5.3 
5.3 
5.3 
5.2 
5.1 
5.1 
5.0 
4.9 
4.7 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.6 
4.7 
4.7 
4.8 
4.9 
5.0 
5.0 
5.1 
5.2 
5.3 
5.4 
5.4 
5.4 
5.3 
5.3 
5.3 
4.6 
4.6 
4.7 
4.7 
4.8 
4.7 
4.5 
4.4 
4.4 
4.3 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.2 
4.1 
4.0 
4.0 
3.9 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
3.9 
3.8 
3.8 
3.7 
3.6 
3.5 
3.4 
3.3 
3.3 
3.2 
3.2 
3.2 
3.3 
3.3 
3.3 
3.4 
3.4 
3.4 
3.5 
3.6 
3.6 
3.6 
3.6 
14.0 
13.0 
12.5 
11.9 
11.4 
11.0 
10.6 
10.4 
10.2 
9.9 
9.6 
9.6 
9.5 
9.5 
9.5 
9.4 
9.4 
9.3 
9.1 
8.9 
8.8 
8.7 
8.5 
8.5 
8.4 
8.4 
8.2 
8.0 
7.9 
7.8 
7.6 
7.4 
7.1 
6.9 
6.6 
6.6 
6.6 
6.6 
6.5 
6.6 
6.8 
6.9 
6.9 
7.0 
7.2 
7.4 
7.5 
7.6 
7.6 
7.6 
7.6 
0.010 
0.015 
0.015 
0.018 
0.018 
0.018 
0.020 
0.015 
0.018 
0.027 
0.031 
0.016 
0.033 
0.032 
0.020 
0.027 
0.032 
0.035 
0.041 
0.051 
0.042 
0.057 
0.082 
0.072 
0.047 
0.044 
0.087 
0.105 
0.058 
0.051 
0.055 
0.079 
0.112 
0.134 
0.164 
0.123 
0.091 
0.102 
0.081 
0.068 
0.067 
0.076 
0.092 
0.081 
0.057 
0.035 
0.030 
0.042 
0.058 
0.053 
0.055 
0.010 
0.012 
0.011 
0.013 
0.017 
0.018 
0.019 
0.013 
0.024 
0.034 
0.034 
0.028 
0.045 
0.029 
0.029 
0.030 
0.036 
0.040 
0.046 
0.045 
0.045 
0.054 
0.060 
0.055 
0.045 
0.045 
0.075 
0.078 
0.060 
0.053 
0.060 
0.095 
0.120 
0.130 
0.120 
0.085 
0.085 
0.080 
0.075 
0.055 
0.060 
0.065 
0.070 
0.065 
0.035 
0.030 
0.030 
0.048 
0.053 
0.050 
0.050 
0.022 
0.024 
0.023 
0.023 
0.026 
0.027 
0.029 
0.025 
0.028 
0.032 
0.037 
0.033 
0.043 
0.041 
0.039 
0.040 
0.040 
0.042 
0.043 
0.049 
0.051 
0.057 
0.067 
0.074 
0.062 
0.062 
0.068 
0.076 
0.080 
0.076 
0.074 
0.084 
0.094 
0.115 
0.139 
0.130 
0.111 
0.124 
0.106 
0.077 
0.084 
0.089 
0.085 
0.086 
0.079 
0.070 
0.059 
0.071 
0.066 
0.064 
0.064 
0.032 
0.035 
0.034 
0.032 
0.034 
0.035 
0.037 
0.035 
0.035 
0.039 
0.047 
0.047 
0.051 
0.052 
0.051 
0.050 
0.049 
0.048 
0.049 
0.057 
0.062 
0.069 
0.078 
0.091 
0.086 
0.082 
0.082 
0.095 
0.106 
0.098 
0.090 
0.095 
0.107 
0.137 
0.160 
0.161 
0.136 
0.142 
0.127 
0.104 
0.106 
0.108 
0.102 
0.104 
0.098 
0.090 
0.079 
0.086 
0.082 
0.081 
0.079 
0.467 
0.395 
0.351 
0.497 
0.549 
0.489 
0.504 
0.447 
0.439 
0.443 
0.436 
0.433 
0.426 
0.416 
0.408 
0.375 
0.372 
0.361 
0.347 
0.351 
0.349 
0.388 
0.404 
0.400 
0.376 
0.359 
0.372 
0.415 
0.368 
0.370 
0.357 
0.352 
0.356 
0.383 
0.332 
0.279 
0.279 
0.281 
0.274 
0.332 
0.351 
0.334 
0.345 
0.341 
0.299 
0.305 
0.320 
0.303 
0.303 
0.287 
0.277 
0.346 
0.340 
0.339 
0.409 
0.498 
0.470 
0.470 
0.431 
0.428 
0.418 
0.418 
0.421 
0.421 
0.421 
0.423 
0.405 
0.407 
0.392 
0.372 
0.373 
0.373 
0.402 
0.411 
0.399 
0.380 
0.362 
0.337 
0.321 
0.329 
0.327 
0.319 
0.309 
0.292 
0.300 
0.293 
0.272 
0.293 
0.315 
0.333 
0.400 
0.384 
0.353 
0.363 
0.348 
0.311 
0.309 
0.327 
0.310 
0.308 
0.303 
0.298 
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1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
11.1 
11.1 
11.2 
11.2 
11.4 
11.6 
11.8 
11.9 
11.9 
11.7 
11.6 
11.7 
12.0 
12.3 
12.5 
12.6 
12.7 
12.8 
5.2 
5.2 
5.2 
5.3 
5.4 
5.6 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.7 
5.8 
6.1 
6.2 
6.3 
6.2 
6.2 
6.1 
6.1 
3.5 
3.5 
3.4 
3.5 
3.6 
3.7 
3.7 
3.8 
3.8 
3.8 
3.8 
3.9 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
4.1 
4.1 
4.1 
7.6 
7.6 
7.5 
7.6 
7.8 
8.0 
8.1 
8.2 
8.2 
8.1 
8.1 
8.4 
8.6 
8.7 
8.8 
8.9 
8.9 
8.9 
0.054 
0.050 
0.062 
0.039 
0.017 
0.011 
0.014 
0.032 
0.050 
0.050 
0.019 
0.002 
0.002 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.001 
0.045 
0.050 
0.060 
0.013 
0.008 
0.020 
0.023 
0.042 
0.060 
0.059 
0.024 
0.005 
0.007 
0.008 
0.008 
0.008 
0.008 
0.008 
0.053 
0.056 
0.060 
0.050 
0.046 
0.040 
0.043 
0.043 
0.048 
0.046 
0.037 
0.033 
0.032 
0.028 
0.018 
0.024 
0.025 
0.021 
0.072 
0.079 
0.084 
0.080 
0.078 
0.068 
0.064 
0.061 
0.065 
0.065 
0.075 
0.073 
0.060 
0.057 
0.049 
0.051 
0.049 
0.050 
0.301 
0.303 
0.330 
0.260 
0.202 
0.222 
0.230 
0.271 
0.279 
0.280 
0.224 
0.179 
0.201 
0.196 
0.211 
0.217 
0.234 
0.251 
0.329 
0.325 
0.341 
0.280 
0.230 
0.239 
0.233 
0.239 
0.245 
0.241 
0.203 
0.167 
0.188 
0.193 
0.195 
0.201 
0.219 
0.241 
15. Historical-cost average age of private nonresidential structures, Table 2.10, line 36. 
16. Historical-cost average age of private nonresidential equipment, Table 2.10, line 3. 
17. Historical-cost average age of private nonresidential intellectual property products, Table 2.10, line 77. 
18. Historical-cost average age of private nonresidential investment, Table 4.10, line 1. 
19. Effective Federal Funds Rate, not seasonally adjusted, observation period first of the year, Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis, Series FEDFUNDS, 1955-2015. Data earlier than 1955 are 12-month averages from the Series 
m13009 of U.S. Discount Rates, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 11/1914-07/1969, NBER Macrohistory: 
XIII. Interest Rates. 
20. Discount Rate for United States, not seasonally adjusted, observation period first of the year. Federal Re-
serve Bank of St. Louis, Series INTDSRUSM193N. Data earlier than 1950 are 12-month averages from the 
Series m13009, U.S. Discount Rates, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 11/1914-07/1969.  
21. Long-Term Government Bond Yields, 10-year, not Seasonally Adjusted. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Lou-
is, Series IRLTLT01USM156N. Data earlier than 1955 are 12-month averages from the Series m13033b, 
U.S. Yield on Long-Term United States Bonds 10/1941-12/1967, NBER Macrohistory: XIII. Interest Rates. 
22. Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond yield, not seasonally adjusted. Federal Bank of St’ Louis, Series 
BAA. 
23. Rate of corporate taxes derived as (Profits - Profits after taxes)/ Profits, both series with inventory valuation 
and capital consumption adjustment. The series were extracted from the database of the Federal Bank of St’ 
Louis and come originally from BEA, account codes A551RC1 and A051RC1, respectively. 
24. Rate of corporate taxes derived as (Profits - Profits after taxes)/ Profits, both series without inventory valua-
tion and capital consumption adjustment. The two series were extracted from the Federal Bank of St’ Louis 
and come originally from BEA, account codes A055RC1 and A053RC1, respectively. 
   
 
